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 Reducing the Dauer Larva: molecular models of biological phenomena 
in Caenorhabditis elegans research. 
ABSTRACT  
 
One important aspect of biological explanation is detailed causal modeling of particular 
phenomena in limited experimental background conditions. Recognising this allows a 
new avenue for intertheoretic reduction to be seen. Reductions in biology are possible, 
when one fully recognises that a sufficient condition for a reduction in biology is a 
molecular model of 1) only the demonstrated causal parameters of a biological model 
and 2) only within a replicable experimental background. These intertheoretic 
identifications –which are ubiquitous in biology and form the basis of ruthless 
reductions (Bickle 2003)- are criticised as merely “local” (Sullivan 2009) or 
“fragmentary” (Schaffner 2006). However, in an instructive case, a biological model is 
preserved in molecular terms, and a complex biological phenomenon has been 
successfully reduced. In doing this the molecular model remains valid in a broader 
range of background conditions and meaningfully unites disparate biological 
phenomena.  
Philosophical Background  
Contemporary intertheoretic reduction of biology -as the epistemological project of 
formally uniting scientific domains with identities, rather than an ontological analysis of 
mereologically differentiated levels-  begins with E. Nagel (1949, 1961), develops with K. 
Schaffner’s application of reduction to genetics (1967, 1993) and arrives at J. Bickle’s ruthless 
reductionism in neuroscience (2003; 2006). It is by this route that the debate has encountered a 
conceptual narrows, where the successful reduction of anything of broad explanatory value from 
biology through into molecular language seems methodologically impossible (Schaffner 2006; 
Sullivan 2009). 
Admittedly (Schaffner 2006), initially promising attempts to connect the formal structure of 
biology, specifically, the laws of classical genetics with those of molecular genetics, failed to find the 
required common axiomatisation, even with significant restrictions and restructuring. But on an 
account of explanation that includes experimental models (e.g. : Cartwright 1983; Hacking 1983; 
Woodward 2003) –where individual models, not entire theories, do the explaining- reduction 
requires mapping between particular biological and molecular phenomena. Such one-to-one maps 
connecting some classically defined gene with a chemically individuated segment of DNA were to 
provide the necessary and sufficient molecular mechanisms for the biologically individuated 
phenomenon. Problematically, such maps appear to reveal many-to-many relations between 
molecular and biological models (Hull 1974). Molecular models exhibit context sensitivity: the 
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mechanisms are individuated in terms of differences in their chemical kinds, but as parts of 
biological wholes one set of chemical cascades can play multiple distinct functional roles in 
different cellular contexts.  Symmetrically, phenomena described by one broadly explanatory 
biological model (paradigmatically: of eyes or wings) can be instantiated in a gerrymandered group 
of molecular mechanisms and are thus multiply realised in the chemistry.  
Like trying to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis, attempts to identify biological 
phenomena with molecular mechanism find themselves confronted either by context dependence or 
multiple realisability. For instance, this is seen in the literature clearly as well understood hurdles to 
unequivocally identifying the molecular mechanism of the electrophysiological phenomenon of 
late-phase long term potentiation in neurons (L-LTP) (Bickle 2003, 2006). Beginning with a 
molecular model requiring a specific “gene expression and protein synthesis” (Bickle 2006 p419) 
pathway that seems promising as the necessary mechanism of  L-LTP, the same pathway 
ubiquitously re-appears in other cells engaged in biological functions completely unrelated to LTP. 
But if we start with a model that is broad enough to range over of all phenomena identifiable as L-
LTP and search for molecular mechanisms, we encounter multiple distinct biochemical pathways 
responsible for the electrophysiological differences (Malenka and Bear 2004). Such difficulties in 
mapping intertheoretic identities have recently re-solidified the anti-reductionist consensus in the 
philosophy of biology despite recent enthusiasm for reductions in neuroscience.  
In response, this paper argues that there is a space between context dependence and 
multiple realisability where numerous intertheoretic identities are already exposed in molecular 
models of experimentally well-characterised biological phenomena. Simple models of necessary 
and sufficient molecular mechanisms of biologically identified phenomena are ubiquitous 
throughout the life sciences but, due to their methodologically precise investigating focus, are seen 
as disconnected fragments incapable of formally unifying anything of explanatory significance 
(Schaffner 2006; Sullivan 2009). These models are central to explanation in biology and have been 
scrutinised philosophically, forming the experimental core of ruthless reductions in neuroscience 
(Bickle 2003), but still remain unrecognised in the literature for their direct relevance to 
intertheoretic reductions (e.g.: Wimsatt 1976; Weber 2005; Schaffner 2006; Bechtel 2006; Craver 
2007; Sullivan 2009). Accordingly, this paper aims to expose the mechanisms of intertheoretic 
reduction at work here by focusing on the recently modeled molecular mechanisms of a complex 
biological phenomenon, an example of sensory-coupled, environmentally-regulated developmental 
plasticity known as dauer arrest seen in the model organism Caenorhabditis elegans.  
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Models such as this one constitute the main points of interaction between chemistry and 
biology and are, themselves, the important identities that locate the causal mechanisms of a 
biological phenomenon within a space of molecular differences. What makes these identities 
justified lies with the fact that they are based on experiments which directly demonstrate the 
dependency of the biological phenomenon on identified molecular differences.  By limiting the 
intertheoretic identity to the precise model of the observed biological effect within the confines of 
the controlled laboratory conditions the problems of context dependence and multiple realisability 
are avoided: the molecular model unambiguously identifies causal mechanisms that are both 
necessary and sufficient to explain the experimentally observed variation in the biological 
phenomenon.  
However, contrary to the explicit arguments of Sullivan (2009) and Schaffner (2006), 
limiting intertheoretic identities to experimentally observed effects does not inhibit greater 
explanatory unification. Rather, it is right here, in the experimentalist’s lab that reductions occur: 
the experiments used to characterise some biological phenomenon as a function of carefully 
quantified manipulations represents the location where both biological and molecular theories 
meet, where the same reliable and replicable experimental result is included and explanatorily 
salient within both theoretical domains. This is how theories in the life science interact. By focusing 
on preserving the causal explanations resulting from controlled experiments biological phenomena 
get into the language of chemistry, as models of the relevant molecular mechanisms. Molecular 
models of biological phenomena can, being now governed by the laws of chemistry, bind to each 
other in terms of their molecular interactions. 
 
Explanation in the Biological Sciences 
Philosophical treatments of explanation are primarily nomological, where to explain is to 
have some phenomenon inferred from a set of initial conditions using laws. However, there is 
scepticism, arising critically in biology, over whether explanations derive their power from the 
normative force of deduction from laws with universal applicability (Smart 1963; Beatty 1995, 
Weber 2005). Many philosophers have argued that causal explanations of phenomena within 
limited backgrounds are, in of themselves, meaningful (Cartwright 1983; Hacking 1981; Woodward 
2003). Such causal explanation does not require that the model be universally, or even broadly, 
applicable, only that the relationship reliably occurs in some specifiable range of circumstances. 
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Here, explanatory power lies in the ability to specify the causally relevant differences behind 
variation in certain measureable quantities. To re-phrase Woodward’s (2003) influential 
formulation, to explain is to ask a set of ‘what happens to this something if these conditions had been 
made a little bit different within this stable background’ questions with answers specifying why this 
something occurred in terms of differences these antecedent conditions.  
This matches up with the explanatory practices throughout experimental biology (Weber 
2005). A simple laboratory experiment explains an observed effect with a basic causal model. It is 
through manipulating, or intervening, to introduce a difference into the experimental conditions (a 
hypothesised cause, i.e.: an independent variable (IV)) and measuring change in this something (the 
modeled effect, i.e.: a dependent variable (DV)) that the measured biological variation is modeled as 
the effect of the manipulations. The explanation for the differences between the two values of the 
DV is thereby interpreted as a causal explanation: the difference in the IV between the manipulated 
and the control condition is explanatory by being a sufficient cause of the observed difference in the 
DV. Within laboratory conditions, experiments using standardised populations of model organisms 
can, and do produce causal models of observed variation in biological traits or behaviours that 
allow significant intertheoretic identities to be formed. As will be argued, such simple identities, 
connecting two distinct theoretical explanations, unify.  
 
Molecular Reductions 
Though the perspectives are varied, the vast majority philosophers reject intertheoretic 
unification through reductive identities. Some prominent philosophers of biology (e.g.: Oyama 1985 
and Dupre 1993) have argued that explanations in biology consist of multiple compatible but 
autonomous theories. This strategy clearly prevents the elimination of biology through a reduction; 
but pluralism does not unify science. Many pluralists have concluded that some unity is derived 
from different models overlapping at certain points. Through the interaction of distinct theories at 
these intersections, multiple disciplines or fields are integrated in order to produce unified 
explanations (Maull 1977; Mitchell 2003; Schaffner 2006; Brigandt 2010). A number of researchers 
take this integrative approach more directly and propose unified mechanistic models that 
incorporate several ontological levels of theoretically independent description into one explanatory 
model of mechanisms at multiple mereologically integrated levels (e.g.: Machamer Darden and 
Craver 2000, Bechtel 2006, Craver 2007). Only a very few see reductions as a legitimate possibility 
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(e.g. Bickle 2003, 2006), and these are criticised as being, at best, patchy and isolated models of 
restricted scope and explanatory value (e.g.: Schaffner 2006; Sullivan 2009).  
However, we argue against this current: significant intertheoretic identities are revealed by 
narrowing our analytic focus on the fine grained details of particular experimental models and 
away from broad theoretical explanations. It is the widely replicable, well-controlled laboratory 
experiments revealing invariant causal relationships in standard model organisms that serve as the 
fulcrum of reductions in biology. This is where both biology and chemistry refer to the same 
experimental phenomena with casual models employing distinct theoretical resources in their 
respective explanations. So a molecular reduction (as we will refer to it here) is the formation of a 
molecular model that experimentally explains the variation in the relevant parameters of a 
biological model in terms of effective molecular causes of the biological variation within the same 
experimental background.  
It is by this last condition that these reductions are clearly distinguished from ruthless 
reductions (Bickle 2003, 2006): while both take the same experimental methods as the mechanisms 
of intertheoretic reduction, molecular reductions remain focused on the experiment itself. This is to 
say that in molecular reductions the point of identity between the two theories is the experimental 
effect, the reliable causal relationship demonstrable in a replicable experiment. In this way, 
molecular reductions are limited in scope to identifying molecular mechanisms of the measured 
experimental effects, not the theoretical phenomenon they are methodologically assumed to 
represent. And it is directly by remaining focused on the experimental results that such reductions 
can avoid the methodological problems ruthless reductions have in extending identities beyond the 
confines of the experimental conditions.  
Bickle argues that research investigating the molecular mechanisms of L-LTP in the 
mammalian hippocampus is an example of the actual practice of ruthless reductionism in 
neuroscience. Experiments where the IV and DV are individuated by distinct theories, using what 
Bickle describes as a methodology of “intervene molecularly and track behaviourally” (2006 p420), 
explain by causally modeling a biological effect in terms of a molecular variation. Explanation of the 
electrophysiological phenomenon of L- LTP induction is thereby in terms of the experimentally 
demonstrated “links” between L-LTP and certain specific molecular mechanisms:  a “structural 
change in the molecular make-up of post-synaptic dendritic spine” (Bickle 2006 p419), as a result 
of gene transcription under the control of a specific isoform of cyclic AMP response element binding 
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protein (CREB). These intertheoretic links are intended to remain explanatory outside the 
laboratory, to phenomena in the world (all cases of induction of mammalian hippocampal L-LTP) 
where the justified inference from the experimental results is that these same mechanisms (specific 
CREB isoform pathway) are responsible for the biological phenomenon seen outside the lab (Bickle 
2003 p99).  
As many others have argued (de Jong and Schouten 2005; Aizawa 2007; Schaffner 2006; 
Sullivan 2009) the attempt to map all cases of LTP to a single molecular model is trying to bridge 
too much across too far a span. They accept that identifying the molecular mechanisms of L-LTP -
and a limited, local reduction- is possible within the highly controlled conditions of any particular 
experimental protocol, but that the experiments justify a claimed reduction of the biologically 
individuated phenomena outside of the specific experimental contexts is something they challenge 
directly on methodological grounds. The methodological challenge is concise: maximising reliability 
can come at the expense of external validity. The very effort to make an individual experimental 
protocol powerful enough to detect a specific effect regularly can impair successful reference to the 
very phenomenon that the experiments are explaining outside of the lab. Directly, it is by 
controlling (and changing, e.g.: Waters 2006) the background variation seen in the natural world 
that the experiment can fail to be representative of the entire biological population. Sullivan 
explains how experimental protocols will be the result of “differential activity of the constraints of 
reliability and validity—as determined by investigative aims and interests of the individual 
researcher or laboratory” (Sullivan 2009 536). Experimental protocols designed to be powerful 
enough to detect a specific molecular effect may be reliable but can suffer from limited external 
biological validity.  
In the case of in vitro LTP research, in order to construct experimental protocols that can 
detect variation in specific molecular signals, the researchers control and cancel out much of the 
biological noise. When biological variation is controlled to get a reliable protocol, the results are not 
directly representative of the intact organism in natural environmental conditions. Increasing an 
experiment’s reliability through by increasing control over variation within the background 
conditions makes it biologically artificial. This limits the experimentally justified inferences to 
situations within the same constrained background. Thereby, as Sullivan argues, Bickle cannot 
generalise and make identities beyond the lab: there are no methodological grounds for concluding 
that the identified molecular mechanisms found in the test tube will function the same way out in 
the world. 
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The consequences of the lack of validity appear as demonstrable counterexamples to any 
broader intertheoretic identity, where the particular molecular mechanisms are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for L-LTP, making it multiply realised (Bregant, Stožer and Cerkvenik 2010). We find, 
as a result, that there is an “Embarrassment of Riches” (Malenka and Bear 2004) when it comes to 
finding multiple distinct molecular mechanisms for the induction of L-LTP, and competing 
hypotheses for the mechanisms at the same neural synapses in the mammalian hippocampus 
(Lisman 2003). This leaves only highly-local reductions, those relations between manipulation and 
effect that have only been demonstrated in the lab. Schaffner explains that such reductions, like the 
disembodied grin of the Cheshire cat, are “patchy and fragmentary” (2006 p378), working only 
within very limited conditions and in need of integration. Extending the metaphor, the body of 
biology sinks below observable levels when an experiment increases its reliability so as to isolate 
only the molecular differences responsible for an effect. Such experimental control identifies 
molecular differences that are specific to the particular experimental effect and thereby cannot 
serve as a general bridge to the broader range of biologically similar phenomena. However, 
studying just the grin may itself guide our inquiries to the point of valid interaction.  
 
Preserving and expanding upon well-designed experiments 
Diverging from traditional accounts, we argue that through reference to the same precisely 
quantified replicable experimental phenomena disparate theories can, and do in important areas of 
biological research, identify common elements. This is where molecular models can avoid context 
dependence and multiple realisability and where valid inter-theoretic inferences can occur. What 
makes these reductions philosophically distinctive is that, paradoxically, preserving the 
explanatory models from experiments within highly controlled, and thereby biologically artificial 
conditions are the means by which the ends of more general and encompassing reductions in 
biology are achieved. As is argued, it is the strictly controlled background of a population of 
homogenous model organisms in highly standardised conditions that actually facilitates the 
explanatory unification of intertheoretic reductions. It is this control that makes these epistemically 
important reductions in that both biological and molecular theories include explanations of the 
identical experimental phenomena, the same experimental regularities. This ability of two theories 
to formulate models of the very same phenomenon constitutes the point of direct contact between 
the theories and the locus of valid intertheoretic inferences.  
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What makes these identities instructive for discussion of intertheoretic reductions is that 
they provide greater systematisation of the biological phenomena with a unified molecular model.  
This completes the requirements for reduction by including separate biological phenomena into the 
explanatory scope of a single molecular model. While this does not resemble most philosophical 
accounts of reduction, it does, as is being argued, achieve its aims: a valid inference connecting 
independent terms in distinct domains (though employing a different mechanism).  
The origins of this account of inter-theoretic reduction can be traced back to Kemeny and 
Oppenheim’s 1956 criticisms of contemporary reductionism and shares with it a similar goal: to 
show that “previous definitions were too narrow in that they excluded most actual cases of 
reduction.”(1956 p17).  On Kemeny and Oppenheim’s definition, reduction is a replacement of one 
theory by another theory, but one that preserves the observational vocabulary and leads to 
equivalent, or greater, theoretical systematisation of the observations. This crucially recognises that 
in the progress of science, preserving the older theory by connecting its laws and generalisations to 
the new theory via bridge principles is unnecessary: laws systematise the observations but do not 
constitute the empirical checkpoints that need to be preserved. For Kemeny and Oppenheim, 
preservation of the observations across an advance in theory, that is, a change that increases the 
systematisation of the observations, is both necessary and sufficient for a reduction.  
Though a fundamental distinction between theoretical and observational vocabularies is no 
longer acceptable and a hypothesis cannot be falsified convincingly in isolation of others, simple 
causal hypotheses tested within replicable experiments can be meaningfully dissociated from their 
broader theoretical motivations. This allows multiple theories to refer to the identical phenomena. 
It is the “reliability of experimental knowledge” (Mayo 1996 110) and the theory-independent 
reality of experimentally demonstrated causal phenomena (Cartwright 1983) that allow the results 
of a replicable experiment to be included in multiple theories. So, retaining the experimental 
relationships that were of significance to biology within molecular models makes the causal 
structure of the biological phenomenon that which is preserved in a reduction. And this is exactly 
what we want preserved across distinct theoretical explanations and carried through progress in 
the empirical sciences: those causally effective relations that have been repeatedly demonstrated 
experimentally. Molecular reduction saves the biological phenomenon as a genuine explanandum of 
a distinct molecular model. 
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But where the biological model of the experimental phenomenon is representative of only 
normal populations, molecular models are able to quantify and directly incorporate more 
experimental results than the biological models. In doing this, molecular models reduce biology: 
unifying multiple biological phenomena by identifying them with elements of one molecular model. 
And, through this unification, molecular reductions show themselves not to be that patchy in the 
end. Molecular models can directly identify the molecular mechanisms behind highly complex 
biological phenomena. This is achieved in dauer arrest in C. elegans.  And because the normal 
population of experimental organisms is only a small subset of the overall background conditions in 
which such identified molecular mechanisms occur, these (and molecularly similar) signalling 
pathways are already studied as chemically defined interactions in a wide range of background 
conditions: in other organisms and in the test tube. Thereby, the explanatory scope of the molecular 
model is much broader than the biological one, so when these mechanisms are found in different 
backgrounds, the molecular model does not break down: the scope of the molecular model is 
derivative of the breadth of the molecular generalisations and the chemically normal conditions in 
which those generalisations hold. We can now see how this works. 
Caenorhabditis elegans: the worm 
The model organism Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans), was chosen as a model organism in 
the 1970s (Brenner 1974), and is now ubiquitous in biology labs where it is used in molecular 
genetics, developmental biology and recently, behavioural neuroscience. The worm, as it is known, 
is, arguably, the most comprehensively understood model animal in biological research. An easily 
housed organism, reproducing hermaphroditically in a three day lifecycle through four larval 
stages, large numbers of genetically homogenous animals (eg: N2 Bristol strain) are cultured in 
highly standardised conditions: Nematode Growth Medium (NGM) agar Petri dishes at 15-25 
degrees C  with worms fed Escherichia coli (Brenner 1974).  This control over environment along 
with invariant development (e.g. determinate cell fates and limited post-transcriptional 
modification of proteins) makes C. elegans an ideal organism for experimental studies needing the 
stability of large numbers of very similar subjects in replicable experimental conditions.  
It is one particular developmental phenomenon that offers an illuminating example of 
molecular reductions. C. elegans, in response to changes in environmental conditions, will enter a 
specialised larval state called dauer arrest (Cassada and Russell 1975). This is an alternative, non-
obligatory larval stage wherein, if the environmental conditions become reproductively 
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unfavourable for the animal, it undergoes a profound morphological, behavioural and metabolic 
change. The dauer phenotype differs from that of reproductive development observably and 
unambiguously and these changes are accompanied by the worm acquiring the ability to endure 
harsh environmental conditions and persist in this state, extending lifespan months beyond a 
normal 14-21 days. When returned to more favourable conditions, worms recover and continue 
reproductive development. 
Dauer arrest is a quantifiable and measureable difference between two possible larval 
stages: a bimorphism and an example of phenotypic plasticity wherein multiple phenotypes are 
expressed by one genotype. Arresting as a dauer larva is one of two possible developmental 
trajectories during the worm’s early larval development, the other leads to a phenotype of rapid 
maturation and reproduction.  It is thereby a true polyphenism of gross anatomical and cellular 
morphology: arresting is not a simple retardation of normal development but a clear example of 
epigenetic control over development. Prior to the first larval moult, when, dependent upon 
differences in external conditions during early larval development, a commitment to develop along 
one of these two paths begins. The process of arrest is a complex sensory integration of three 
environmental signals during the first and second larval stages with critical points at the first and 
second moults; environmental conditions after each moult begins do not alter the developmental 
trajectory and no intermediate cases of arrest are observed in wild-type worms (Cassada and 
Russell 1975; Fielenbach and Antebi 2008).  
Dauer-like larval stages are major features in the dispersal and reproductive strategies of 
nematodes, where having biologically appropriate responses to changing environmental conditions 
is how animals deal with a variable world. The induction of developmental changes in response to 
contingent conditions is how many species of nematodes survive the unfavourable times or 
disperse through the environment (Viney 2009). In the genus Caenorhabditis, evolutionary 
explanation for why there is a period of arrest include (among others) that it is as an adaptation to 
the cyclic nature of their food source. Importantly, dauer arrest is composed of two independent 
phenomena: the induction of arrest as a response to environmental influences and the expression of 
phenotypic differences between dauer and reproductive development. It is this period of induction 
and a causal model of the process of commitment to development as dauer that has been the focus 
of detailed research that is of interest to this reductive project. 
11 
 
 
Characterising Induction of dauer 
Donald Riddle (1977) began a series of basic exploratory experiments to quantifiably 
characterise the induction of dauer arrest in the N2 Bristol strain as a response to contingent 
environmental conditions. Manipulating different parameters of standard culturing conditions, his 
lab uncovered three independent but interacting parameters that induced dauer arrest: population 
density, food levels and temperature (Golden and Riddle, 1982; 1984a; 1984b). In addition to the 
differences to what was varied in the protocols, when manipulations occurred had dramatic effects 
on induction. Induction has two critical points at each of the first two moults when bifurcations of 
developmental paths take place that determine whether or not worms arrest. Prior to the first 
larval moult, if crowding, food and temperature remain within a range, worms irreversibly commit 
to reproductive development through a second L2 larval stage. However if conditions exceed 
certain limits based on all three parameters, worms enter a distinguishable pre-dauer L2d. At this 
stage, the worm changes observably but has not yet irreversibly entered dauer arrest. So, if the 
worms are transferred to standard culturing plates in sufficient time before the second moult, the 
worms will moult to the regular L3 stage. Otherwise, populations of worms arrest at rates 
dependent on strengths of the interacting environmental signals.  What emerged from this were 
reliable empirical models showing changes in the rates of dauer arrest were causally dependent 
upon (could be increased or decreased) specific quantified and differentially timed changes in 
environmental conditions (Golden and Riddle, 1984a; 1984b). 
 
FIG 1:  the model of dauer arrest (from D Riddle Lab)  
So, by manipulating culturing conditions prior to two bifurcation points (L1 and L2d 
represented in FIG 1) , worms could be reliably manipulated into arresting as dauer. And despite 
the extensive laboratory research using worms (and comprehensive reporting of results), only four 
independent manipulations  to culturing conditions have been reported to have any significant 
effect on varying the rates of induction of dauer arrest (WormBase.org Phenotype 0001539): 
a)  food level   (WBPhenotype:0000148)  
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b) cholesterol level (WBPhenotype:0001847) (discussed below) 
c) temperature  (WBPhenotype:0000639) 
d) pheromone level (WBPhenotype:0000132) 
(WormBase.org Phenotype Index 2011) 
 
Biologically salient phenomenon  
Differences between each of these four conditions along with the differences to their timing 
represent biologically salient differences in the environment that cohere with biological (ecological-
evolutionary-developmental) explanations of dauer arrest. Each particular experiment models one 
environmentally salient observation (overcrowding, starvation, cholesterol deprivation or heat 
stress) and connects it to the salient developmental response by the organism: induction of arrest 
as dauer that permits reproductive survival through such harsh environments. Thus, each 
individual condition has a good ecological and evolutionary explanations citing response to 
ecological pressures and subsequent differential rates of survival based on a chosen developmental 
path.  The relevance of these experiments is as evidence integrated into broader theoretical 
explanations.  Additionally, though dauer induction is primarily a developmental phenomenon its 
relevance extends to explanations in ecology, evolutionary, and neuroscience, and can be seen as a 
relevant case study in the analysis of research in the emerging field of eco-evo-devo and how we 
understand the relations between its component disciplines’ models (e.g. : Hall and Hallgrímsson 
2008; Gilbert and Epel 2008).  
 
The experimental manipulations:  the dauer assays 
While research on dauer induction has wide ranging theoretical influence, it is, however 1) 
the causal regularities found in 2) the highly controlled, replicable conditions of the experimental 
protocols that forms the philosophically interesting point of intertheoretic identity. These protocols 
produce easily replicable conditions in which dauer arrest is reliably induced. These form the stable 
fulcrum of reduction that remains unaffected by conceptual changes, or differences in disparate and 
seemingly incommensurate theories. 
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Each of the four independent manipulations (a-d) is a simple variation of the standard 
cultures (Brenner 1974) and consists of one manipulation that increases rates of arrest: these are 
known as dauer assays. They are also 2) the experimental background conditions in which 1) the 
causal regularities are found.  
In the standard cultures, the absence of arrest is expected; normal worms do not arrest 
without one of the conditions a-d falling outside a range. However, a) conditions of food 
deprivation reliably induce dauer arrest at rates significantly above controls in standard cultures. It 
is the lack of food that directly explains arrest in this situation and is 2) a specific experimental 
protocol that can be repeated and where 1) this reliable regularity can be observed.  However, b) 
only removing cholesterol from the standard culturing plates (which is a component of NGM) also 
induces arrest, albeit at low but significant frequencies, but does so in the presence of food (Gerisch 
et al., 2001). These two distinct phenomena with independent explanations for why there was a 
difference in observed rates of arrest. In one, the difference in food conditions (+/- e coli)  between 
the intervention and control conditions explains differences in rates of arrest, while in the other it is 
a distinct set of conditions (+/- cholesterol) that causally explains why there is a difference when 
contrasted with control conditions.  
In c) the third treatment, only temperature of the standard cultures was changed: worms 
will arrest at much higher rates than controls (in 15-25 C) when exposed to 27 C temperatures 
(Ailion and Thomas, 2000). In d) the final of the four conditions, the only difference is to the levels 
of exogenous daumone -a chemically well-characterised molecule that is produced by worms 
(Butcher et al 2009) - is added. During the early characterising experiments, D. Riddle discovered 
that a given level of additional daumone would induce arrest as a function of food available in the 
environment and that raising levels above 25µl/2ml NGM at 20 C reliably induced dauer at rates of 
100%, even in the presence of abundant food (Golden and Riddle, 1984b).  
It is this set of repeatable replicable experimental protocols that form the basis of the 
tractable interaction between biological and molecular theories. The regularities seen in these 
dauer assays can be referred to by both the biological as well as the molecular theories, each 
drawing their own theoretical implications from the very same replicable phenomena. How a direct 
intertheoretic link is established is seen by the fact that the manipulated conditions in the biological 
experiment (the dauer assays) have become the controls in the molecular ones. This is the identical 
14 
 
 
experimental relationship in both molecular and biological theories that is identified in a molecular 
reduction.  
Disentangling the biological phenomenon from the biological theory  
Now, even though biological theories were used in designing the experiment and modelling 
the hypotheses tested, replicable experiments justify our inference that the experimental 
phenomena exist independently of the biological explanations. In reproducing one of the 
experiments, e.g. culturing in high daumone levels, the expectation would be to observe high rates 
of arrest. Why this is expected is based on previous experiments demonstrating this regularity in 
these same controlled conditions. What allows such an expectation in this situation is the 
phenomenological generalisation which would be reliable and predictive, even if one remained 
wholly ignorant of the biological explanations (or if they were, perhaps, incorrect). This is what 
replicable experiments provide: a reasonable expectation about what would happen in the world 
under certain conditions, expectations that are not dependent upon broad theoretical commitments 
or assumptions but only on local causal regularities discovered in limited contexts.  
It is replicability that allows distinct theories to model and explain the same regularities. 
Accordingly, in conditions of high pheromone (where arrest is guaranteed) or on the standard 
plates (where dauer is exceedingly rare) finding that an intervention (e.g.: of the worms’ 
physiological structure or genetics) changes the expected rates of arrest, one can conclude that this 
difference causally explains the differences in rates of arrest. By manipulating an experimental 
treatment group in these controlled conditions one contrasts the rates of response with those in the 
control group; but the control group is just the regularity of response that is explained biologically. 
So the justification for the claim that both biological and molecular theories are referring to the 
same phenomenon is that the molecular experiments are occurring in the identical conditions. This 
fact forms the intertheoretic identity –it is the same reliable, repeatable phenomenon that was 
identified in the biological experiments that is being modeled and explained with molecular 
interventions. As argued for in Bickle (2003), with such experimental methods it is the molecular 
manipulation that explains the variation in the biological trait. However, unlike in Bickle’s model, it 
is only the measured variation seen in the experimental background that is identified, not the 
theoretically entangled biological or psychological phenomena.  
15 
 
 
The molecular model 
The past three decades of research on the induction of dauer arrest has produced “a unified 
model for dauer formation whereby graded signals from the environment regulate a hormone-
dependent switch” (Fielenbach and Antebi 2008 pg 2157). This switch is a physiologically widely 
expressed nuclear hormone receptor complex (DAF-12 NHR) that controls development through 
controlling gene expression. In the absence of its naturally occurring ligand, the hormone 
dafachronic acid (DA), DAF-12 NHR, interacting with heterochronic genetic signalling, binds with a 
co-repressor (DIN-1) to deactivate reproductive development and activate a sequence of specific 
dauer programs.  
The regulation of DAF-12 NHR through critically timed changes to levels of DA is the 
regulation of arrest: DAF-12 remaining unliganded by DA is required for dauer formation (Magner 
and Antebi 2008). However, while the regulation of DAF-12 NHR is considered to be sufficient (in 
normal worms) and necessary (in all known experimental conditions) for arresting in C. elegans 
(Magner and Antebi 2008), to reduce the model of dauer induction requires the molecular modeling 
of the environmental regulation of the NHR, not just identification of the switch itself.  
While the regulation of DAF-12 is the regulation of dauer arrest, the receptor itself is only 
regulated through DA at critical points to induce dauer at specific times. So it is insufficient to cite 
only DA differentially binding to DAF-12 as the mechanism of dauer arrest; it is also necessary to 
include the relevant regulatory mechanisms to avoid the problem of context dependence.  This 
includes both a molecular model of the regulation of DAF-12 by DA -namely the regulation of the 
timing of arrest based on the difference in the timing of DA bonding with DAF-12-, and the 
regulation of DA production- its regulation by molecular signalling pathways connected to 
environmental inputs. This means that the model of arrest must complete the connection of DAF-12 
regulation, through the regulation of DA by signalling pathways that connect back to variation in 
each of the four environmental conditions that induce arrest 
Arresting as a dauer involves changes in a complex network of signalling pathways with 
multiple spatio-temporally defined steps, modulated by many different factors. However, a complex 
and coherent molecular model of the causal structure of the biological model (the environmental 
differences -food level, cholesterol level, temperature and pheromone level- and the developmental 
timing differences at the two crucial points -represented as L1 and L2d bifurcations in FIG 3) has 
now been formed.  
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The basic model of regulation 
The regulation of arrest is a complex molecular model and can only be sketched in its 
broadest outlines: a very small review for a small worm. In sensory neurons ASI and ADF activity of 
a guanylyl cyclase pathway (cGMP) is regulated by competing signals from several different classes 
of G-protein coupled receptor molecules (GPCR) that respond differently to food signals and 
daumone (Bargmann and Horvitz 1991). These GPCRs are exposed to the external environment 
inside sensory structures called amphids where they modulate cGMP. cGMP is up-regulated in the 
presence of food or down-regulated in the presence of daumone. In the ASI and ADF neurons 
increased activity of cGMP up-regulates the activity of an insulin-like pathway (IIS). In only the ASI 
neuron, lowered cGMP signalling also suppresses a transforming growth factor-β (TGF-β)-like 
pathway. In ADF as well as AIX and AIY interneurons, cGMP and serotonin signalling both decrease 
with increases of temperature (Ailion and Thomas, 2000). It is in these neurons that these three 
environmental signals are modulated, the final signal (cholesterol- which is not neural coupled with 
environmental signals) is integrated with the neural signalling at the next stage, the production of 
DA in the XXX cells.  
The XXX cells are endocrine cells and the location where the DA hormone biosynthesis 
pathway becomes involved; these cells express DAF-36 and DAF-9: the first and final stages in the 
synthesis of DA from cholesterol. During early larval development, the two XXX cells remain in 
physical contact with these amphid neurons which allows for direct signalling from the neurons by 
the TGF-β and IIS pathways. In these cells, membrane bound receptors, DAF-1/DAF-4 and DAF-2, 
respond to the lowered extracellular TGF- β and IIS signalling from the neurons.  Lowered IIS 
signalling stops inhibiting DAF-16/FOXO; reduced TGF- β signalling reduces DAF-8/ DAF-14 
signalling which inhibits DAF-3/DAF-5. Both DAF-16/FOXO and DAF-3/DAF-5 prevent DA 
synthesis but are inhibited themselves under conditions of high TGF- β and IIS signalling from the 
neurons.  
These signals from the neurons and ultimately from environmental conditions converge on 
the modulation of DAF-9 levels in XXX cells. DAF-9 completes the process of converting cholesterol 
into DA. So, due to the fact that C elegans requires cholesterol in its diet, its absence explains why 
the cholesterol deprivation conditions induce arrest independently of the others. So it is the 
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modulation of DAF-9, the final stage in the production of DA, which represents the mechanisms by 
which integration of these molecular signalling pathways occurs.  
Finally, because DA is a steroid hormone (Motola et al 2006) it can diffuse rapidly 
throughout all the worm’s tissues where it can bind to DAF-12 NHR, and temporally coordinate the 
regulation of gene expression across the entire organism. The coordination involves DAF-12 NHR 
interaction with the heterochronic genes lin-4, lin-14, lin-28, lin-29 under a regulatory feedback loop 
controlled by a family of let-7 micro-RNAs (Hammell, Karp and Ambros 2009) to control DAF-
12NHR. This stage represents the temporal mechanisms of the critical developmental periods 
(bifurcations in FIG 1) . Without DA during the late L1 larval stage, DAF-12, interacting with genes 
lin-4, lin-14, will halt the gene expression required for reproductive development. With 
reproductive genetic programs switched off, the appropriate L3 cell division programs are not 
initiated –explaining the L2d phenotypic differences- and the worms continue the development 
along the path to complete arrest unless levels of DA are increased before a critical time.  DA is 
capable of reversing arrest via action of continued activity of the genes lin-28 and lin-29 prior to the 
point where metabolic activity in the worms almost completely ceases. Herein, commitment to 
arrest is achieved and the process of dauer induction is complete: if DA levels are raised, worms 
will no longer recover to activate L3 cell division programs but proceed directly to arrest and 
recovery as post-dauer L4 (FIG 1). 
What has been achieved in the case of dauer arrest is establishing the identity of the 
molecular differences that explain the observed difference in rates of arrest discovered in the 
characterising experiments and reliably observed in each of the dauer assays and controls. What 
this model of its regulation does is disambiguates the function of DAF-12 in distinct biological 
contexts. The inability to identify DAF-12 NHR as the molecular mechanism of the experimentally 
observed rates of arrest was due to the fact that it was regulated by additional environmental and 
developmental factors. By including the regulatory mechanisms of DAF-12, from DA all the way 
back to variation in the different environmental conditions during developmental stages -all within 
a single molecular model- allows a route from defined molecular variation to be mapped directly 
onto the biological phenomenon: the regulation of this network is necessary and sufficient for the 
induction of dauer arrest. So here we have the answer to the challenge from context dependence: 
quantifying the relevant context disambiguates functions. It is the differential activity of complex 
regulatory networks that form the molecular mechanisms that are identified with the biological 
phenomenon of induction of dauer arrest. We can now try to analyse this claim.  
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The Philosophical Manipulation  
Molecular reductions are different from many traditional approaches to intertheoretic 
relations as they begin with an examination of the experimental results. However in this way they 
are much like many recent analyses of reduction and explanatory unification (Bickle 2003; Mitchell 
2003; Bechtel 2006, Weber 2005, Schaffner 2006; Sullivan 2009; Brigandt 2010). But by focusing 
on intertheoretic identities in the lab they are clearly distinguishable from both recent integrative 
models of unification and ruthless reductions. However, despite the fact that the intertheoretic 
identities between biology and chemistry are limited to causal relations in experimental conditions, 
they remain significant reductions.  
Like ruthless reductions, molecular reductions unify by modeling the effective experimental 
manipulations of a biological effect at a single molecular level and, thereby, reduction is achieved 
through intertheoretic identity. Alternatively, many philosophers look at these same kinds of 
experiments and describe mechanistic explanations (Wimsatt 1976; Machamer, Darden and Craver 
2000), or strategies of localisation and decomposition (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Bechtel 2006).  
The philosophical accounts they offer explicate how models at the molecular level are integrated 
into explanations of biological phenomena. These are not intertheoretic identities and remain 
broadly pluralist in orientation in so far as integration is characterised by the use of multiple 
theories in one explans.  
Though highly heterogeneous, integrative explanations in biology generally involve 
elements from many distinct theories that form a single coherent explanation of how some 
biological process takes place (Maull 1977; Mitchell 2003, Bechtel 2006; Schaffner 2006; Craver 
2007; Brigandt 2010). In this way integrative explanations are composites that include everything 
from mathematical models and computational simulations to experimentally demonstrated and 
well-quantified effects.  These are combined into one single model where each element contributes 
to the explanation as part of the explanans for some biological explanadum. It is the use of multiple 
theoretical levels integrated together into one explanans that unifies and demonstrates that there is 
significant intertheoretic communication and exchange of information between the disciplines; this 
is also the reason why these are pluralist positions that do not establish intertheoretic identities.  
In this regard, molecular reductions are not multi-level explanations; they provide an 
exclusively molecular explanans for a biological explanandum. For example, spatially localising the 
production of DA to the XXX cells does not constitute a physiological level element in the explanans.  
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The physiological differences (presence or absence of cell) are not the explanatory element of the 
model, the cell is merely the locus of the causally relevant molecular differences. A physiological 
manipulation, ablating cells, may change the gross anatomy, but nonetheless, the physiological 
changes are only the means to achieve specific molecular changes (i.e.: removing hormone 
production –farm and lab animals are castrated for the same reason). Ablating a cell removes its 
particular molecular properties from the system, and identifying the molecular difference models 
the causal factor in terms of molecular-level differences. This is not a multi-level explanation but an 
explanation based on hypothesised and experimentally tested molecular differences, not gross 
physiology.  So ablating the XXX cells alters the molecular conditions and the relevant difference is a 
drastic reduction in DA levels (Ohkura et al., 2003). It is this molecular difference that explains 
changes in arrest, not the physiological difference. Correspondingly, the molecular model of dauer 
only explains why there is a difference in rates of arrest between the experimental and control 
groups within these replicable conditions. The specific explanandum is the differential rates of 
arrest as seen in the laboratory within the dauer assays.  In this way the worm’s physiological 
structures and developmental differences are not part of the explanandum but the controlled 
background conditions for investigating the mechanisms for the induction of dauer arrest.  
And so it is by being only the causal mechanisms behind the experimental effect that is 
identified with the molecular model, molecular reductions avoid the kinds of problems with 
multiply realised biological phenomena (e.g.: L-LTP) that remain a problem for ruthless reductions. 
The phenomenon identified herein is the rate of induction of dauer arrest, unequivocally identified 
with both physiological measures and chemical tests for arrest; the experiments all explain a single 
effect with the same measurements. That this is the same explanandum in both biological and the 
molecular models is transparent in so far as the experiments measured the same effect the same 
way. Quite directly, what is being explained by both theories’ models is the effect as observed in the 
test tube (Petri dish or Erlenmeyer flask to be precise).  
So we can see that the molecular model adequately identifies the necessary and sufficient 
causal mechanisms of the specific experimental effect, but one only seen in the lab; it does not 
explain all biologically salient cases of the induction of dauer in the wild. Nonetheless, contrary to 
the explicit views of Sullivan (2009) and Shaffner (2006), this is, by itself, an important point of 
intertheoretic contact, a reduction of a biologically salient phenomenon.  A central goal of 
intertheoretic reduction is to form identities that preserve reference where both theories refer to 
the same phenomena: preservation of reference with an identity explains how there is meaningful 
20 
 
 
connections and communication between scientific domains (reduction as unification, 
distinguished from autonomy), not to mention any theoretical continuation as opposed to 
incommensurate change (reduction as progress, distinct from revolution). In the worm, it is the 
experimental model of arrest (FIG-1) that has been preserved within a molecular model.  
What makes the reduction of dauer induction illustrative lies in comprehensiveness of the 
molecular model: all biologically identified causally effective pathways from the environment that 
were found in the dauer assays (food level, cholesterol level, temperature and pheromone level 
together with the timing around two critical points) are represented in the molecular model.  By 
finding the molecular mechanisms of the what, when and where of induction that the molecular 
model of how worms were induced to arrest as response to the environment was finally traced out 
from beginning to end. So since this is the identification of the many distinct molecular signalling 
pathways responsible for a complex and biological significant phenomenon, this is also clearly a 
reduction that exhibits significant unification of the biological sciences, to which we can finally turn.  
The Circe Effect: from biological enthymemes to molecular deductions. 
This reduction unifies by linking all the experimental manipulations into a single model; the 
main benefit of the reduction arises from the fact that this model remains valid in a broader range 
of conditions. This is seen directly in the dauer research where experiments in multiple conditions 
(in the dauer assays) can all use a single molecular model. The wider potential unification of 
molecular reductions is seen in the role such molecular models play in the molecular biologist’s lab 
in order to explain more biological process with molecular mechanisms and connect a wider range 
of biological phenomena within the single molecular model. 
Practically, explaining variation in rates of dauer arrest through a single molecular model 
provides a more unified explanation than the biological models. Since the induction of dauer 
consists of two biologically independent redundant and parallel pathways (a neuro-sensory and a 
distinct metabolic coupling with the environment -c elegans requires dietary cholesterol), a single 
molecular model that includes both as elements of one set of regulatory mechanisms of DAF-12 
NHR –converging on DAF-9 (see above) is substantively more unified. Thus, the primary 
importance of this reduction lies in the comprehensiveness of the molecular model which directly 
demonstrates that a reduction can retain complete models of complex phenomenon from 
developmental biology (i.e. FIG-1). So extending Schaffner’s metaphor, in the case of the induction 
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of dauer arrest we may only have a grin left to study, but as is characteristic of Cheshire cats, it is 
very wide and reveals much. 
This is where the biologically limited conditions of highly controlled experimental 
backgrounds display their full potential for theoretical unification.  The worm, being a simple and 
stable system, forms a set of replicable background conditions in which bio-chemists study and 
better “understand the nature of biomolecules and the interactions among them” in terms of 
“molecular phenomena such as molecular recognition, the hydrophobic effect, multivalency, 
enzymatic catalysis, and signal transduction” (Hulme and Whitesides 2011). Using the worm, 
researchers can experimentally detect specific chemical differences over the molecular noise of 
many regulatory networks running at full steam. Methodologically, this makes the worm the test 
tube in which precise molecular events can be studied against the background of a complex living 
system. This molecular research exposes more depth and detail to the causal structures of the 
various phenomena, exposing molecular mechanisms by which disparate models of other biological 
phenomena can connect to each other: it can bind multiple biologically significant phenomena as 
elements of one larger molecular network and include more of it as a model of a single 
interconnected system. This is how greater explanatory unification of biological models takes place. 
The final virtue of molecular reductions is thereby revealed as they provide the general 
means by which unification proceeds: disparate biological phenomena are interconnected in terms 
of activity of their causally relevant molecular pathways. The ability to see the living system in 
terms of molecular mechanisms unifies biology by giving us the means by which to conceive of 
distinct biological processes as processes of one system. Like the metabolic and neural pathways 
are unified through their convergence as causal pathways on a single molecular mechanisms, we 
can model more of the underlying molecular mechanics of the many parts of the Rube-Goldberg 
structure of living systems in terms their unified causal structure, now seen as one interacting 
mechanism at the molecular level, as a single system of interacting parts. This unity is only revealed 
at the molecular level where the systematic causal relations between different biological models are 
exposed. 
We can finally see that molecular reductions provide molecular mechanisms for connecting 
seemingly distinct models. Such points of identity are thereby significant reductions through the 
quantification of a biologically important model within a molecular space, distilling the causal 
structure of phenomena to the effective chemical differences. These chemical differences interact as 
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a network of biologically identifiable molecular pathways that attach to each other through their 
chemically governed interactions. Unification, and a molecular reduction is thereby achieved by 
allowing molecular bonds to form between biologically independent phenomena. 
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